Obama's Doctrine

One can assume that the collapse of the Soviet Union, the downfall of Communism and the democratization of the Eastern European states, were the founding factors for the 30-years old Barak Obama. We can only presume, that the victory of democracy over the dictatorships of the Soviet Union strengthened the worldview of the young Obama, that the status quo as a political state, cannot be maintained and that it is only a matter of time, until the dictatorships collapse and in their stead a new light will shine upon the world – democracy. This worldview is also anchored in the semi-religious American belief that the final victory of liberal democracy is a matter of historical determinism. (By the way, the Marxist fathers also believed in this, but their aim was Communism and not democracy!).

Two decades later, Barak Obama won the Presidency of the United States and only then, did he begin to learn, how complicated life and the world were, multi-faceted and full of contradictions.

For the first time, he began to understand the dilemma of choosing between the national interest and his belief in the vision of values (the moral vision). A review of his first two years in the White House shows that he believes that he can go forward and lead the United States, walking a fine line between these two extremes.

The first flag that he raised was that of making peace with the Muslim world. Obama believed that he would be the first American president to make peace and reconcile between America and the Muslim world. To advance this ideal, he adopted a defensive doctrine of disengagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, in contrast to his predecessor's policies, which supported the use of force to advance the ideals of freedom and democracy. In order to advance his doctrine, Obama started his first tour to the Middle East in Ankara and Cairo, and articulated his message on two Muslim platforms. Perhaps history will determine that Obama's speech hastened the "Arabs Spring" in the Muslim world, as he calls it. In any event, the response of the rulers in the Muslim states was luke-warm at best.

From the moment that the "Jasmine Revolution" in Tunisia and the "Spring Revolution" in Egypt began, Obama chose to support the masses and not the countries where the revolutions were taking place. This was support of masses without leadership, with no agenda and without a plan, with the exception of populist demands that the country's leadership resign. Instead of supporting strategic allies, of many years standing and trying to influence them to go down the road of reforms, in order to satisfy the masses' demands, Obama chose this path, out of a belief that the status quo would not survive in any event. It did not occur to him, even for a moment, that the status quo could indeed survive. Perhaps it could be maintained for a while longer and in the meantime they should try and influence the rulers to advance – even in small aggregates – in the direction of more freedom? This was a demonstration of first-class political naiveté on the part of an American President who, more than anything else, needs to maintain the dominant standing of his country in the world.

It should be pointed out that in the Arab states on the west of Tunisia – Algeria as well as Morocco, the status quo continues. In Algeria, due to emergency measures and the armed strength of the military regime, i.e. because of the fear factor, but in Morocco, because of the King's political wisdom, i.e. because of the people's belief in the King. Immediately after the breakout of the riots in Tunisia, the King of Morocco announced changes in the Constitution, whereby he cancelled his authority to appoint the Prime Minister and, in light of this change, the party gaining a majority, would present its candidate for the position of Prime Minister. The King announced additional reforms, which he would put into effect gradually, and the streets of Rabat and other Moroccan cities calmed down. I would like to state, that it is quite possible that the status quo may end, but nobody can determine exactly when this will happen, i.e. between the particular moment in time when the anger erupts and the regime falls, there is sufficient time to at least try to adopt a policy of crisis management, in order to maintain the existing regime whilst implementing improvements and changes.

The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, within the context of the "Arab Spring", is a classical case study which proves the political naiveté and the confusion of the White House. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are similar to those between the U.S. and Puerto Rico. Iranian presence in Bahrain is the same for Saudi Arabia, as a Russian presence in Puerto Rico is for the U.S. According to the Saudi Arabian King Abdullah, the security of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain can be compared to two bodies with one soul, i.e. their defense and security interests cannot be separated.

The Saudis believed that after the Khomeini Revolution in 1979, the geo-strategic composition in the Middle East was a bloc of Sunni states supported by the United States against the Shi'ite Iran. The "Spring Revolutions" suddenly disrupted this equation. Iran supports the Shi'ites who take to the streets in Bahrain, Egypt announces the renewal of relations with Iran and advances the agreement between the Fatah and the Hamas and the U.S. dithers and dallies. As soon as the riots started in Bahrain, the U.S. pressured the Saudis and the Bahrainis to enter into negotiations with the Shi'ites, in order to reach an agreement on the division of power in Bahrain, between the rebellious Shi'ite majority and the ruling Sunni minority. The Saudis perceived this to be casus-belli and treason on the part of the U.S. They believe that the first surrender of an Emirates ruler to the demands of the masses, would create a precedent resulting in a revolution in all the Gulf states including Saudi Arabia. On the 14th March, the Saudis sent armed forces and tanks to Bahrain to crush the uprising, despite the Americans' last minute efforts to prevent this. The Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, Jeffrey Platman, was in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, when the riots started and he attempted to negotiate between the parties. The Saudis perceived this step to be the U.S.'s abandonment, such as Obama had done to Mubaraq. Obama's personal phone call to King Abdullah was received with open reluctance. Visits of the American Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to Saudi Arabia during March, were rebuffed by the Saudis and the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, was received by the King only at the beginning of April. Less than a week after Gates' visit, Thomas Donilon, Obama's National Security Adviser, appeared at the court of King Abdullah, bearing a personal letter in his pouch for the King. At the end of March, the Saudis, in order to send a clear signal to the Americans, dispatched Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., to China, India and Pakistan. The message to the Americans was clear: If you abandon us, we will not remain alone, we will find others who will help us to protect our regime. In order to further complicate the "diplomatic ballet" between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in recent months, one must include the Saudi deal to purchase aircraft from the U.S., for the unbelievable amount of 60 billion dollars, which was announced in October 2010, as well as a giant strategic maritime deal, the purpose of which was to develop Saudi naval capabilities against Iran, which was publicized in April 2011.

What can be learned from all the moves which I have described?

There are two groups in the White House who are altercating with each other. The first are the idealistic liberals led by Obama and the second are the pragmatic idealists. The former believe that advancing democracy worldwide is the United States primary interest. Whereas, the others believe that the U.S. foreign policy must take many other interests into account. Obama is trying with all his might to compress, in one fell swoop, all the values and interests, and as we can see, this does not always go hand in hand. In the case of Saudi Arabia, even the recommendation to take the path of gradual reforms, would not succeed, because of the venerable age of the regime's leadership. King Abdullah is 87, Prince Sultan, the next in line, is 80 and the third Prince Naif, is known for his conservatism.

Returning to Obama's Israeli-Palestinian doctrine. Obama's speech on 19 May was finely-tuned, not so much in relation to Israel, despite his remarks about the 1967 borders making headlines in Israel. But, rather, regarding everything relating to his entire worldview. With regard to the Saudi Arabian issue, for example, he stated in his speech: "There will be times when our short-term interests do not fully align with our long-term vision for the region" (end of quote). An elegant phrasing indeed, in order to bypass fundamental contradictions!

The foundation stone of his doctrine is that the U.S. must support the citizens of the Middle East and not the rulers of these states. The sub-text of this statement is that they must support the populist demands of the masses for reforms, instead of supporting their strategic allies of many years standing. In other words, he is saying that the State of Israel is not the only U.S. ally in the region. So what is evident from his statement is that in order to obtain the support of the Arab-Muslim public, the U.S. must be seen not only as the supporter of the masses on internal reforms, but also as the supporter of the aspirations of the Palestinians. In other words, the Palestinians who are demanding liberation from the occupation, establishment of a free and democratic state, as the Egyptian masses or the Syrians are demanding to depose the dictatorship and establish democracy, and therefore it is an American interest, which is no less important than the American interest in supporting Israel.

In Obama's speech of 19 May, there are quite a few positive statements as far as Israel is concerned, such as the demand to recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people, a Palestinian demilitarized state, objection to the Palestinians' planned move to request U.N. recognition in September 2011 of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, as well as a temporary I.D.F. presence along the Jordan Valley. This last point, according to Obama's interpretation, is problematic and it is this which resulted in Bibi's extreme response. The White House, for some reason, perceives Israel's security only as a function of its relations with the Palestinians and the West Bank, and they draw up an equation, according to which Israel will withdraw from the Jordan Valley if and when the Palestinian state stops threatening Israel. What is lacking in this equation are two elements: One – the time element (according to Israel – a long time) without taking into account what is happening in the field, and the second, the removal of the total threat of other states which threaten Israel and the capability to make use of the Jordan Valley as an exit base and spring-board to attack Israel in the future. What Bibi meant to say in the U.S. is, that Israel would be able to withdraw from the Jordan Valley only when the Middle East is like Europe after 1989 (i.e. the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union threat against Western Europe).

And again, back to the doctrine. On the one hand, it includes many fiery speeches, but in actual fact, the U.S. displays defensive liberalism and takes a supportive role and not a leading one, in the states where the uprisings are occurring. The U.S. will not intervene militarily in order to advance the democratic process, and in those states where the equation of risks versus benefits is problematic (such as in Syria and Iran), the U.S. will only impose sanctions. We have already mentioned the fall of the Berlin Wall. Obama was 30 years old at the time and the Spring of Eastern Europe succeeded because of: The existence of a civilian society with many years of tradition, a strategic American superiority, superior American ideology, massive support from the Western European countries for their Eastern neighbors, and of course the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not one of the above conditions exists in today's Middle East, which are imperative in countries without the tradition of a civilian society and where the immediate and real alternative to the status quo is the Islamic ideology.

To summarize, in the regional and global environment of today, there are too many unknown variables and the global and regional stability is volatile. There is insufficient space to cover the uncertainties and instabilities in the world; from the economic situation in the U.S. and Europe, to the American withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Iranian threat intertwined with Syria, Hamas and Hizbullah, The "Spring Revolution" etc. It would only be realistic, to ponder aloud whether this is the optimal situation to renew the political negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.